Cinta de Moebio: Revista de Epistemología de Ciencias Sociales

Miranda, R. (2017) Determinismo, compatibilismo y escepticismo respecto al libre albedrío. Cinta moebio 60: 295-305. doi: 10.4067/S0717-554X2017000300295

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Determinism, compatibilism and free will scepticism

Rafael Miranda-Rojas (rafaelmirandarojas@gmail.com) Facultad de Ciencias Religiosas y Filosóficas, Universidad Católica del Maule (Talca, Chile) ORCID: 0000-0002-6603-070X

Abstract

This paper discusses the free will scepticism claim and discerns whether the compatibilism - incompatibilism debate presupposes a rationalistic/necessitarism stance about if a subject S acts freely. The last ten years makes it possible to establish a relevant distinction between an action being free, without discarding causal antecedents of that action. Specifically, this does not lead to a compromise with the so-called Principle of Alternative Possibilities or with the Consequence Argument. It will be discussed how the experiment developed by Libet comprises whether a free action is equivalent to a conscious action, considering the relevance of freedom of veto and the role of the control criterion of an action. A relevant edge in this analysis will be the epiphenomenalist stance. Finally, it will be evaluated the impossibilist modal alternative and its role in a sceptical position regarding free will.

Key words: free will, determinism, control, fatalism, epiphenomenalism.